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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA JEAN MADSEN and \ 
BARBARA JEAN MADSEN as \ 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF DEB-
ORAH JEAN MOFFIT, a minor, J 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, I 
v s . ' [ • ' • 
ESTATE OF EUGENE TIFTON \ Case No. 
MOFFIT, JR., DECEASED, AR- / 
LENE C. MOFFITT AND ARLENE 
C. MOFFITT AS GUARDIAN AD 
LITEM OF MICHAEL MOFFIT, a 1 
minor, and EQUITABLE LIFE AS- I 
SURANCE SOCIETY OF THE I 
UNITED STATES, I 
Defendants-Appellants, j 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Estate of Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., Arlene C. 
Moffitt, and Arlene C. Moffitt as Guardian ad litem of 
Michael Moffitt, a minor, appeal from summary judg-
ment in an action to adjudicate adverse claims to the 
ownership and right to receive the proceeds of an in-
surance policy on the life of Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., who 
died accidentally on July 16th, 1974. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents, Barbara Jean Madsen and Barbara 
Jean Madsen as Guardian ad litem of Deborah Jean 
Moffitt, a minor, brought this action against Appellants 
and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States to determine the ownership and right to receive 
the proceeds of the group life insurance policy #12560, 
After paying the policy proceeds into the Court, the in-
surance company was dismissed as a party. Appellants 
and Respondents filed motions for summary judgment 
based on the pleadings, attached exhibits, and stipula-
tion of the facts. After a hearing on the motions and 
memoranda of authorities submitted by both parties, 
the Court below granted the motion of Respondents and 
denied the motion of Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek the reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and the granting of judgment in favor of 
Appellants as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The decedent, Eugene T. Moffitt, Jr., as an em-
ployee of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, was insured on his life 
by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States under a continually existing group life insurance 
policy. The policy, #12560, was issued to the decedent 
in January, 1958, with a supplemental policy being is-
sued February 1st, 1967. Both policies were not for a 
2 
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fixed sum but based on a sliding scale proportional to 
the salary of the insured. The policies are sufficiently 
similar in terms and identical in value so as to allow 
treatment as a single policy for purposes of this appeal. 
In 1967, the decedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean 
Madsen, entered into a stipulation in a property settle-
ment made in contemplation of divorce. Paragraph 3 
of the stipulation reads: 
3. The defendant hereby stipulates and agrees 
to maintain in full force and effect the life in-
surance he presently maintains through group 
coverage in connection with his employment for 
the benefit of plaintiff and the minor child, and 
in addition, to maintain health and accident in-
surance through such group coverage for the bene-
fit of the minor daughter of the parties. 
The divorce decree became final on December 7th, 
1967. At that time, the Equitable Assurance policy 
#12560 was worth a total of $18,000.00. Respondents 
base their claim for all the proceeds of policy #12560 
on Paragraph 4 of the divorce decree. While alive, the 
decendent fully conveyed all property so ordered under 
the decree to Respondents and fully carried out all sup-
port obligations to them. The only contention on the 
part of Respondents as to a failure to perform the obli-
gations of the divorce decree relate to the decedent's 
subsequent change of beneficiary on the life insurance 
policy. , 
On May 28, 1968, the decedent married Appellant, 
Arlene C. Moffitt. Shortly after his remarriage, on 
June 11, 1968, the decedent changed the named bene-
3 
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ficiary on the Equitable Assurance policy from Respond-
ent to Appellant. Decedent died July 16, 1974 intestate. 
At that time, the policy was worth a total of $34,000.00 
and constituted the only sizeable asset in the estate of 
the decedent. 
Respondent, Deborah Jean Moffitt, the child of de-
cedent and Respondent, Barbara Jean Madsen, was sev-
enteen years old at the date of decedent's death and has 
since reached her majority. Appellant, Michael Moffitt, 
the child of decedent and Appellant, Arlene C. Moffitt, 
was two years old at the date of his father's death and 
will be three years old on June 15,1975. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVISION OF THE DIVORCE DE-
CREE WAS INTENDED BY THE PARTIES 
TO SERVE AS SECURITY FOR THE PER-
FORMANCE BY THE DECEDENT OF HIS 
DIVORCE OBLIGATIONS. 
The Appellants, unlike the claim recently asserted 
in Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis (Utah Su-
preme Court No. 13662, Filed January 24, 1975), do 
not contend that the divorce decree provision ordering 
the maintenance of insurance is void or otherwise un-
enforceable. Rather, Appellants assert that the divorce 
decree provision being a contractual obligation should 
be interpreted so as to give effect to the intentions of 
the contracting parties. As stated in Barrus v. Wilkin-
son, 16 Ui2d 204,398 P.2d 207 (1965): 
4 
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In interpreting a provision in a contract, this 
court will try to determine the intention of the 
parties, and a defendant, normally, is bound only 
to the extent the terms expressly indicate, or at 
least fairly and reasonable imply an obligation, 
at 205, 206. 
In determining the intentions of the decedent and Re-
spondent in entering into the stipulation to maintain 
the insurance policy which was subsequently incorpo-
rated into the divorce decree, the background and sur-
rounding circumstances of the agreement should be con-
sidered. Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prod-
ucts, Inc., 30 Ut.2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973). This 
should also include an consideration of the usual legal 
obligations existing at the time of the contracting to 
determine if any extra-ordinary obligations were in-
tended by the parties. 
The general rule is that due to the limited nature 
of alimony, a divorce court cannot normally order a 
husband to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the 
former wife. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, 
§613. The reasoning of the majority of courts is that 
an order to pay insurance premiums is in the nature 
of alimony, and that obligation ceases at the death of 
the husband. Additionally, courts hold that they have 
no authority allowing them to give a former wife a 
benefit which derives solely from the husband's death 
as opposed to a benefit arising out of the marital rela-
tionship itself. 59 ALE 3d 9. There is a split of au-
thority as to the power of a divorce court to order the 
maintenance of insurance when that order is based on 
5 
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a provision of a prior property settlement between the 
parties. In Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis, 
supra, this Court addressed the issue for the first time, 
holding that under Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 1973, a divorce court could order the 
maintenance of an existing life insurance policy on the 
husband for the benefit of the wife and children. 
In the present appeal, no reconsideration of the 
power of a divorce court to order the maintenance of 
an insurance policy for the benefit of the wife need be 
made. Paragraph 3 of the stipulation required the de-
cedent to maintain certain insurance for the " benefit 
of plaintiff and the minor child." But, in Paragraph 8 
of the same stipulation, the plaintiff, now the Eespond-
ent, being "wholly capable of self-support" waived "any 
claim she may have to receive alimony." The order to 
maintain insurance was not made therefore as alimony 
to be paid in a lump sum. 
The second possible intention of the parties and 
purpose of the divorce court in incorporating the pro-
vision on insurance would be to provide additional child 
support payments beyond the monthly payment of $75.00 
ordered in the decree. In Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 
53 P. 1010 (1898), this Court held that the determina-
tion of whether the obligation to support a child sur-
vived the death of the father depended on the nature 
and terms of the divorce decree. The Utah position was 
reaffirmed in Colombo v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 
26 Ut. 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998 (1971). In Colombo, while 
noting the great flexibility of Section 30-3-5, supra, this 
6 
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Court held that a divorce provision requiring insurance 
on the life of the father to be maintained in a set amount 
for the child until the child had completed college or 
other educational training did not necessarily show that 
the support obligation was to continue against the fa-
ther's estate. Bather, this Court concluded that the in-
surance, which was of a set amount, was to take the 
place of the monthly support obligation placed on the 
father while living. It was determined that the father 
was not leaving the child an estate in addition to the 
support obligation, but had merely concluded that the 
amount of the insurance proceeds was the amount nec-
essary to support the child until emancipated should the 
father die prior to this time. 
Colombo, supra, is in accord with the general rule 
that a divorce court cannot award any of the father's 
property to the children since a father is only obligated 
to support his children, not to settle an estate on them. 
Under this rule, it has been held that a divorce court 
lacks the power to order a father to maintain life in-
surance for a child since this goes beyond the normal 
support obligation. 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Sepa-
ra, §837. In addressing this issue, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held a divorce decree ordering the maintenance 
of a life insurance policy of $10,000.00 for each child as 
irrevocable beneficiary void stating: 
The purpose of the law is to continue in effect 
after divorce the same legal obligation of sup-
port which the father owes to the children from 
their birth to their majority, where the marriage 
continues throughout that period. This obliga-
tion does not include any legal duty on the part 
n 
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of the father to take out an insurance policy on 
his life in favor of each child. . . . It can hardly 
be contended that the law places upon the di-
vorced parent any greater obligation toward his 
children than he has in the absence of divorce. 
Laws v. Laws, Colo., 432 P.2d 632 (1967), at 635. 
In the case at bar, the deceased entered into a stip-
ulation to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his 
minor child. There is no language in the agreement to 
show that the parties contemplated imposing any greater 
obligation on the deceased than his legal duty to sup-
port his minor child. Under the doctrine of Murphy v. 
Moyle, supra, a support obligation which is to continue 
after the father's death must be shown by the nature 
and terms of the decree or it will be assumed that the 
obligation terminated with the death. The instant de-
cree contains no such exceptional language. Therefore, 
a reasonable interpretation of the provision to main-
tain insurance would be that the parties intended that 
the insurance serve as a type of security for support 
payments in the case that the father died prior to the 
child reaching her majority. Such an interpretation is 
similar to that of Colombo, supra. 
The concept of providing security for the payment 
of a support obligation is founded in Utah law. In 
Murphy v. Moyle, supra, this Court affirmed the re-
quirement that the husband furnish a lien on certain 
property as security for his support obligations stating 
that the security could be required when it appears to 
be needed or equitable. The concept was extended in 
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) when 
8 
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this Court sanctioned a lower court order for the de-
fendant in a divorce proceeding to obtain a set amount 
of insurance with the plaintiff as beneficiary. The in-
surance was to be maintained until the defendant had 
extinguished his debt to the plaintiff. The case was re-
manded to determine if the defendant was correct in 
asserting his uninsurability and to decide if a property 
lien might not be adequate security. 
Unlike the provision in Travelers Insurance Com-
pawy v. Lewis, supra, the present provision is limited 
to the minority of the decedent and Respondent's child. 
In Traveler's Insurance, this Court held that the term 
"minor children" as used in the divorce decree " . . . was 
merely descriptive of their status at the time, and we 
think it was not meant to make them contingent bene-
ficiaries only during their minority." Such a conclu-
sion was warranted in that case since at the time of the 
decree one of the children was not a minor legally but 
seventeen years old and married. Since the parties in 
Travelers Insurance also agreed to maintain child sup-
port for this child despite her reaching her legal major-
ity, the parties clearly did not intend to restrict the 
children from being beneficiaries simply because of their 
reaching their majority. Additionally, the provision in 
Travelers Insurance was conditioned on the wife remar-
rying or dying. The futuristic nature of either of these 
conditions again emphasizes the intention of the parties 
not to limit the children as beneficiaries based on their 
reaching majority. Very different facts are present in 
the instant appeal. Here, the decedent agreed to main-
tain the life insurance policy for the benefit of his minor 
9 
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child and in the same paragraph to maintain health and 
accident insurance for his minor child. In Paragraph 
6 of the divorce decree, and Paragraph 2 of the stipula-
tion, the decedent and Eespondent agreed that the sup-
port obligation of the child would terminate upon the 
child reaching majority. Taken as a whole, the divorce 
decree clearly shows that the parties intended all child 
support to terminate when the child reached majority. 
Thus, the intention of the parties in agreeing to main-
tain the insurance was to maintain it only during the 
child's minority. 
Since the decedent and Eespondent clearly did not 
intend the insurance to serve as alimony and appear to 
have intended the insurance to only be maintained dur-
ing the minority of their child, Appellants contend that 
the insurance should be viewed as security for the pay-
ment of the support obligations of the decedent under 
the reasoning of Dixon v. Dixon, supra. Once the obli-
gation was terminated, here once the minor child reached 
majority, the requirement of security would no longer 
be needed. Eespondent, Deborah Jean Moffitt, reached 
her majority on February 28, 1975. Appellants would 
therefore propose that if Eespondent, Deborah Jean 
Moffitt, has not received any child support payments 
from the date of decedent's death to the date of her 
majority that such payments be awarded out of the 
insurance proceeds at the rate of $75.00 per month as 
per the divorce decree. Additionally, Appellants would 
propose that a sufficient amount of the insurance pro-
ceeds be put in escrow for Eespondent, Deborah Jean 
Moffitt, to allow her if she desires to pursue a college 
10 
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education or other professional training even though the 
decedent was not so legally obligated. 
POINT II 
THE BENEFICIARY OF A LIFE INSUR-
ANCE POLICY WHICH A DIVORCE COURT 
HAS ORDERED TO BE MAINTAINED CAN-
NOT REASONABLY EXPECT NOR ACTU-
ALLY RECEIVE AN AMOUNT OF PRO-
CEEDS GREATER THAN THAT EXISTING 
AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
Even if the insurance is not viewed as security for 
performance of a support obligation, and is viewed as 
disposition of property which confers vested interests 
in Respondents, Appellants would contend that Respond-
ents could not reasonably expect to receive any greater 
amount than the amount of proceeds existing at the 
time of the decree. Despite the increase in the amount 
of proceeds from the time of the decree to the date of 
death in Travelers Insurance v. Lewis, supra, this issue 
was not raised in that case nor in any prior Utah decision. 
Under this view, Appellants would not contend that 
Respondents have no interest in the insurance proceeds. 
Rather, Appellants would argue that Respondents can-
not reasonably be entitled to any more proceeds than 
they would have received if the decedent had died on 
the day of the stipulation and divorce decree. While 
there is little case law on point, two recent cases have 
considered the question, White v. Michigan Life Insur-
cmce Co., 43 Mich.App. 653, 204 N.W.2d 772 (1972), and 
Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 415 F.2d 
312 (10th Cir. 1969). 
11 
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White v. Michigan Life Insurance Co., supra, in-
volved facts very similar to those at bar. The decedent 
agreed in a divorce decree to maintain a group life in-
surance policy issued by Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety of the United States on his life for the benefit of 
his minor children. Actually, the decedent was insured 
under two group life insurance policies, one by Equi-
table Life worth $15,000 at the time of the decree, and 
the other issued by Michigan Life Insurance Company 
worth $2,000.00 at the time of the divorce decree. The 
decedent never named his children as beneficiaries un-
der either policy, but he did subsequently name his sec-
ond wife as beneficiary under both policies. At the date 
of his death, both policies were still in effect and had 
increased in value to $25,000.00 on the Equitable Life 
policy and $6,000.00 on the Michigan Life policy. The 
Michigan court found that the divorce judgment applied 
only to the Equitable Life policy and was limited to the 
insurance in existence at the time of the divorce decree. 
The court awarded $15,000.00 to the first wife, presum-
ingly as trustee for the children, and $16,000.00, the 
amount of the after-acquired value of the insurance, to 
the second wife. The court concluded that the intent of 
the parties in entering into the insurance provision of 
the divorce decree was only to give the first wife and 
children the amount of insurance in existence at the time 
of the decree. 
Similarly, in Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co., supra, a divorce decree incorporated a property 
settlement requiring the decedent to maintain a group 
life insurance policy on his life for the benefit of the 
12 
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first wife for a period of ten years. Three years later, 
the decedent acquired survivorship benefits in connec-
tion with the same policy. Five years after the divorce 
decree, the decedent remarried and changed the benefi-
ciary on the policy, including the original and survivor-
ship benefits, to his second wife. Decedent died and the 
second wife claimed all the benefits by the insurance 
contract while the first wife claimed all the proceeds 
by the divorce decree. The Tenth Circuit Court held 
that the first wife was only entitled to the insurance in 
existence at the time of the divorce decree and not to 
the survivorship rights which came into existence three 
years after the divorce decree even though such bene-
fits were connected with the same policy. Thus, the sec-
ond wife was awarded the survivorship proceeds while 
the first wife received the original policy proceeds. 
In the case at bar, Appellants argue that the Equi-
table Life Insurance policy #12560 was worth a total 
of approximately $18,000.00 on December 7th, 1967, the 
date of the divorce of the decedent and Respondent. 
The policy was worth $34,000.00 on July 16th, 1974 the 
date of the death of the insured. The after-acquired 
value of the insurance amounts to $16,000.00 and under 
the reasoning of White v. Michigan Life, supra, and 
Peckham v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra, this 
amount should be awarded to Appellants. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
The provision of the property settlement as incor-
porated into the divorce decree requiring the decedent 
to maintain the Equitable Life Insurance policy #12560 
for the benefit of Respondents should be construed in 
accordance with the intent of the parties to the agree-
ment. Unless language clearly points to a contrary re-
sult, the intent of the parties should be interpreted as 
creating no greater obligation than that which is im-
posed under the law. The present stipulation and di-
vorce decree contain no language which would imply 
that the parties contemplated any obligation greater 
than that normally imposed on parents to support their 
children until majority. The provision ordering the 
maintenance of insurance should be construed in light of 
this Court's sanction of requiring security for the per-
formance of support obligations. 
If the insurance is not viewed as security and Re-
spondents are viewed as having acquired a vested in-
terest in the proceeds, this interest should be limited to 
the amount of insurance in existence at the time of 
the divorce decree. Such a limitation would be in ac-
cordance with the intents of the parties at the time of 
entering into the agreement since the amount existing 
at the time of the decree is the most that Respondents 
could have reasonably expected to receive. 
Appellants would urge the Court to grant the pro-
ceeds of Equitable Life Assurance policy #12560 to Ap-
pellants with a reservation of funds for Respondent, 
14 
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Deborah Jean Moffitt, sufficient to pay any past due 
child support at the rate of $75.00 per month, and if 
applicable, sufficient funds in escrow to allow her to 
pursue a college education or other professional train-
ing. In the alternative, Appellants would urge the Court 
to grant the proceeds of Equitable Life Assurance policy 
#12560 acquired and accumulated after December 7th, 
1967, the date of the divorce decree, to Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER of 
ATHAY, BOWN & VAN SCIVER 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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